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Many studies in the tradition of so-called “new accounting his-
tory” (Napier, 2006) contributed to a rich understanding of the
evolution of professionalism in the accountancy field in the late 19th
and 20th century. From a critical perspective, for instance, the role of
professional accounting organizations in the early struggle for
gaining legitimacy in Anglo-Saxon communities such as England,
Scotland, the UK and the US was closely examined, arguing how the
organization of the profession was instrumental in serving the self-
interest of the profession, in subtle interaction with the public ser-
vice of accounting as a common good (e.g., Walker, 1991, 1995, 2004;
Preston, Cooper, Scarbrough, & Chilton, 1995; Robson, Willmott,
Cooper, & Puxty, 1994; Wilmott, 1986). A similar evolution
emerged in other countries such as Australia, Belgium, Canada and
South Africa (e.g., Carnegie& Edwards, 2001; Chua& Poullaos, 2002;
De Beelde, 2002). A key argument in these critical analyses is that the
professional organization of accountancy was, and still is, motivated,
at least in part, by the wish to protect “established accountants from
interlopers” by “erecting market shelters” and controlling profes-
sional membership through “the imposition of exclusionary closure”
(cf. Walker, 2004, p.127). To achieve this, the profession lobbied for a
subtle combination of self and state regulation (cf. Maijoor & van
Witteloostuijn, 1996), offering an account of collective entrench-
ment and status maintenance (Walker, 1991, p. 257).* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: adivarci@ku.edu.tr (A.D. Çakmaklı), christophe.boone@
uantwerpen.be (C. Boone), a.van.witteloostuijn@vu.nl (A. van Witteloostuijn).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2020.101104
0361-3682/© 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.In the early days of accountancy, a “continual quest for legiti-
mation” (Preston et al., 1995, p. 507) characterized the profession.
In this context, professional organizations were established as po-
litical bodies that “focused upon the specifics of their mode of self-
government, including their efforts to gain the state’s support and
legitimation of their occupational closure… the establishment of a
professional body offers the organizational means of regulating
both the quality and flow of ‘professional’ services, thereby limiting
labour supply and raising its market value … professional associ-
ations have sought to create monopolies of labour by restricting
entry, by determining the type and duration of training and by
regulating the mode and standards of practice” (Willmott, 1986, p.
558 & 559). This critical role of self and state regulation is
emphasized in the neo-institutionalist account of the field’s history
across countries (see, e.g., Suddaby, Cooper, & Greenwood, 2007),
including the essential force of professional associations
(Greenwood, Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002).
We contribute to this literature by adding insights from a lens
complementary to critical analysis and neo-institutionalist theory:
organizational ecology (cf. Br€ocheler, Maijoor,& vanWitteloostuijn,
2004). Specifically, we argue how the evolution of accountancy as a
profession is heavily influenced by the evolution of accountancy’s
professional associations. In so doing, we offer another theoretical
account of the emergence of the accounting firm as a new organi-
zational form, arguing that the role of the interaction between
professional associations is critical, particularly the extent to which
these professional associations compete or collaborate, or fight or
unite. Theoretically, we take modern organizational ecology’s
density dependency theory as our stepping stone, combined with
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extensively introduce and explain this abstract line of theoretical
reasoning. Next, we apply this logic to the concrete case of the early
decades of the (Dutch) accounting industry, developing tailor-made
hypotheses. Subsequently, we test our hypotheses with detailed
density count data about the Dutch accounting industry in the
period 1884e1939. We end with a conclusion and discussion.
2. Theoretical framework
2.1. Two countervailing forces
The form emergence process is a central topic in organization
theory (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Hannan, Polos, & Carroll, 2007;
McKendrick, Jaffee, Carroll, & Khessina, 2003; Rao, Monin, &
Durand, 2003). Organizational forms “represent classes of organi-
zations the audience understand to be similar in their core features
and distinctive from other classes of organizations” (Fiol &
Romanelli, 2012, p. 597). Therefore, in an emerging field or popu-
lation, organizations face a daunting task: they need to develop
identities in the absence of population-level legitimacy, balancing
uniqueness e in order to differentiate themselves from others to
carve out their own distinct niches e with similarity e in order to
build a collective identity facilitating the form’s taken-for-
grantedness (Deephouse, 1999; King, Clemens, & Fry, 2011). New
organizational forms gain legitimacy, i.e., gradually obtain a taken-
for-granted status, when audiences develop shared understandings
about the core features that define the form. It is well established in
the literature that an increasing number of organizations that carry
the core features of the nascent form facilitates the development of
shared understandings and, therefore, increases the legitimacy of
that form (Hannan & Freeman, 1989). However, organizations have
to be similar enough because otherwise the development of shared
understandings among audiences is hampered (Bogaert, Boone, &
Carroll, 2010; McKendrick et al., 2003). At the same time, in order
to carve their own individual niche, organizations need to be
different from each other as well, which represents an important
dilemma in emerging organizational forms.
The pressure to develop a unique organizational identity and a
collectively shared identity often spurs an emerging population’s
members to strategically push different opinions about how to
organize the field, which schemata to apply, and how to perform
the new tasks. This two-pronged search for identity and legitimacy
often triggers fragmented collective action, where actors in a
nascent field are likely to disagree about what constitutes the core
identity features of the new organizational form (Rao, Morrill, &
Zald, 2000). The end result of this tension is that organizations
self-organize around different sub-populations that have different
identity claims and that all aim for dominance, resulting in the
emergence of different sub-populations or sub-forms striving for
legitimacy (Rao et al., 2000). Sub-forms or sub-populations refer to
the groups that support different institutional logics for the orga-
nizational form.
We focus on two countervailing forces that underscore the
complexities associated with the organizational form emergence
process. That is, we develop the argument that the effect of frag-
mentation among niche-carving activities by different groups of
collective actors on founding rates is a double-edged sword. On the
one hand, such contestation blurs boundaries, opens up resource
space and reduces entry barriers, so spurring the founding rates of,
andwithin different types of sub-populations. Density in the niches
of these sub-populations will increase as a result, positively
affecting these sub-populations’ legitimacy and founding rates in
turn. On the other hand, however, these contestation processes
increase population-level fuzziness and decrease the overalllegitimacy of the organizational form by suppressing the founding
rates. Moreover, given that population-level legitimacy tends to
spillover to less favored sub-populations (Barnett & King, 2008),
especially sub-populations that offer high perceived quality tem-
plates are expected to suffer most from decreases of the legitimacy
“commons” at the population level.
2.2. Organizational and collective identity realization
In emerging populations, organizations need to carve out niches
and create resource space out of nothing for survival (Lounsbury &
Glynn, 2001). This goes hand in hand with the need to realize
organizational identities that embody the new form’s central,
enduring and distinctive characteristics, and that address two
fundamental questions: “who are we as an individual organiza-
tion?“, and “who are we as a group of organizations?” (Albert &
Whetten, 1985; Whetten & Mackey, 2002). For populations that
already have a taken-for-granted status, proven recipes with
respect to organizing routines and institutional logics can be
adopted relatively easily by newly founded organizations. If
different sub-population carve out different niches, however,
multiple logics exist that compete for attention (Dacin, Goodstein,
& Richard Scott, 2002). Then, population-level identity realization
is a huge challenge, being a critical threat in emerging fields that
lack shared understanding.
On the one hand, organizations must develop unique individual
identities by differentiating themselves from their competitors; on
the other hand, reducing population fuzziness requires the devel-
opment of a common ground to spur the taken-for-grantedness of
the new form. Therefore, members of a nascent form have to
develop distinguishing organizational features that specify the
ways in which the organizational actor is both similar to and
different from others in the emerging field (Greenwood & Hinings,
1993; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Scott, 2001; Whetten, 2006).
While individual organizations try to find their similarities and
differences, group identification is essential for effective social ex-
change and accountability (Whetten & Mackey, 2002). At the
population level, organizations need to construct their common
characteristics associatedwithmembership ties. As Aldrich and Fiol
(1994) point out, the uniqueness of a single organization during the
early stages of an industry’s development is not sufficient, but must
be counterbalanced with the collective efforts of all players in the
emerging industry to jointly produce a new identity.
As a result of this tension, a single answer to the “who are we?”
question cannot be easily found; within a single emerging popu-
lation, multiple and competing answers to this critical identity
question circulate. Indeed, consensus on a single institutional logic
(and hence rapid institutionalization of the new form) is the
exception rather than the rule (Purdy & Gray, 2009). In general,
different potential categories or logics are available, and different
claims can be made for different audiences as to what is appro-
priate (Whetten & Mackey, 2002). As a result, self-categorization
processes become important whereby the organizations’ mem-
bership in identity categories or sub-population groups are
declared (Whetten & Mackey, 2002). By making positional choices
when entering the emerging population, organizations carve out
niches and gradually realize their identities (King et al., 2011),
structuring long-run competitive and symbiotic relationships
(Albert, Ashforth, & Dutton, 2000).
2.3. Fragmented collective action, competing logics and boundary
expansion
In the absence of a single institutional logic, which provides the
organizing principles to guide activity, collective action plays a key
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within emerging fields (Galvin, 2002; Rao et al., 2000). The
dilemma between organizational uniqueness and collective iden-
tity, however, generally leads to fragmented collective action. In-
dividual organizations claiming specific identities self-organize
into distinct collective groups that try to push their core features
and schemata that define the nascent form (Bogaert et al., 2010;
Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). As the answers concerning the “who are
we?” question differ, collective actors make claims and counter-
claims in an effort to legitimate certain groups over others, defining
firm routines and capabilities inways that they believe will provide
them with a competitive advantage (Glynn, 2000; Reay & Hinings,
2009). During this process, different institutional logics emerge
that compete for dominance.
An important consequence of the niche-carving activities of
multiple collective actors is that resource space is opened up for
different sub-populations. When alternative institutional logics
compete for dominance, newcomers will have different options in
terms of the templates to adopt. Theymight even strategically push
new institutional logics in order to develop distinguishing identity
features. As a result, self-regulatory fragmented collective action
expands the boundaries of the whole population by opening up
niches for entrepreneurs. As the number of competing institutional
logics increases in the emerging field, the number of sub-
populations and hence population-level fuzziness increase, too. In
contrast, when a single institutional logic dominates the emerging
field, the boundaries of the new population will be more solid,
which reduces new entrants’ differentiation and positional oppor-
tunities, and hence increases a population’s entry barriers. With
respect to the founding process, we therefore expect that founding
rates in different sub-populations will increase due to fragmented
collective action. This affects organizational densities in these
emerging sub-populations, which e according to density depen-
dence reasoning e increases the legitimacy of that particular sub-
population, further spurring sub-population founding rates
(Kuilman & Li, 2009).
2.4. Fuzziness and population-level legitimacy
The growing number of organizations that adopt different
templates paradoxically undermines the legitimacy commons at
the population level. This follows from the revised density depen-
dence theory as developed by Hannan et al. (2007). The revised
theory stresses the importance of sense-making and cognitive
categorization processes among core audiences in the form emer-
gence process. Established organizational forms are pictured as
categories with high taken-for-grantedness, which implies strong
consensus about the labels and schemata that apply to members of
the category. In nascent forms, however, perceptual ambiguity
abounds and classification is cumbersome. The new category’s la-
bels and schemata are only partially applicable. As a result, fuzzi-
ness is high, which hampers the development of shared
understandings and taken-for-grantedness.
In classic density dependence theory, the assumption is that
each organization is a full member of the nascent form and that
legitimacy increases with each and every additional member. The
new theory, however, emphasizes the impact of fuzziness, implying
that individual organizations have a different “grade of member-
ships” (GoM) in the emerging field. The theory predicts that if au-
diences perceive organizations to have low GoMs, then a nascent
form does not stand out against its background (referred to as
contrast), which precludes the emergence of a taken-for-granted
category (Bogaert et al., 2010). As a corollary, the revised density
dependence theory predicts that adding organizations with low
GoMs to a population might even reduce the field’s legitimacy asfuzziness (contrast) increases (decreases).
Population-level legitimacy is a common good that is created by
collective action. As with all common goods, they are open to
exploitation and free-riding (Barnett & King, 2008; Lenox, 2006;
Ostrom, 1990). In a similar vein, legitimacy is not expected to
spillover to all types of members of a nascent form to an equal
extent; some might benefit (suffer) more from the legitimacy
commons (fuzziness) than others (Bogaert et al., 2010; Kuilman &
Li, 2009). For instance, Bogaert et al. (2010) argue that especially
low-quality organizations would benefit (i.e., have lower mortality
rates) from population-level legitimacy as they lack a strong and
robust organizational identity. Conversely, they argue that the
negative impact of increases in a population’s fuzziness would
backlash more to high-quality organizational members. Before
developing specific hypotheses on the basis of this rather abstract
logic, bringing the above argument to life in the context of the




The emergence of the Dutch accounting industry can be traced
back to late 19th century. As the number of modern enterprises
operating with limited liability started to increase, the need for
accounting and auditing went up as well (Bogaert et al., 2010; de
Vries, 1985; Maijoor, Buijink, van Witteloostuijn, & Zinken, 1995).
Even though labels such as bookkeeping and controller were
already established, due to the changes related to the Industrial
Revolution, accounting emerged as a new profession in the
Netherlands (Bogaert et al., 2010; de Vries, 1985; Maijoor et al.,
1995). In this period of the industry’s history, which lasted until
after the Second World War, as is clear from the historic account of
de Vries (1985); cf. Bogaert et al., 2010), demand for accounting
services was “created” with much effort by accountants and their
associations in an environment that was unregulated.
So, we can reasonably assume that supply-side variables (such
as density, associations, et cetera) affect subsequent legitimacy/
demand, which in turn drives foundings. However, the new pro-
fession struggled to gain legitimacy as a result of the absence of
consensus among accountants about how to set the main rules for
the profession, such as the required expertise and rules of conduct.
As a consequence of this disagreement, accountants organized into
different associations in order to convince the external audience
about the necessity of their profession, emphasizing that their
members had the expertise to answer to this need (Bogaert et al.,
2010; de Vries, 1985). Over time, the disagreement resulted in the
establishment of a series of self-regulated associations competing
for dominance.
The first Dutch professional society of accountants, Nederlands
Instituut voor Accountants (NIVA), was formed in 1895 (Buijink,
1992). However, an independent audit of financial statements
was only made obligatory by Dutch law in 1961 for listed com-
panies, implying that the Dutch accounting industry had a long
period in an unregulated environment (Buijink, 1992). Even after
the foundation of the first Dutch professional association, clear
institutional codes about how the profession should eventually
look like were lacking (de Vries, 1985). The ultimate goal of NIVA
was to define the profession of accounting, the function of ac-
countants, and the necessary qualifications to be an accountant.
According to NIVA, a candidate had to pass an official exam in order
to be qualified as an accountant.
At the end of the 19th century, the number of accountants
continued to increase; however, theywere not all members ofNIVA.
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members, in order to keep the emerging profession’s standards
high. However, their selectivity in accepting new members trig-
gered the establishment of a new association called Nederlandse
Bond van Accountants (Bond) in 1901. Bond, too, established criteria
for member acceptance; however, the level of the exam they
required was lower than that of NIVA. Hence, Bond reflected a lower
quality than NIVA. The establishment of a second association failed
to solve the conflict among accountants; quite to the contrary, as
this gave way to the establishment of even more associations. In
1902 and 1903, two other organizations were founded: Nederlandse
Academie van Accountants, and the Nationale Organisatie van Ac-
countants. This period is characterized as the “disorganization of
the profession” in the De Accountant, which was the official peri-
odical of NIVA (Bogaert et al., 2010).
The disagreement about the qualifying exam, selection criteria
and how to perform as a profession continued over decades, with
all associations seeking dominance. Two further events illustrate
this prolonged state of contestation. First, an attempt to establish a
monopoly association to unify all others in 1904 even resulted in
the establishment of yet new associations. Second, the difference of
opinion as to the requirements to be qualified as an accountant not
only emerged between associations, but also among members of
NIVA. As a result, a new association called the Nederlandse Ac-
countants Vereniging (NAV) was established as a NIVA spinoff in
1907. The aim of NAV was to increase the standards of the profes-
sion beyond those promoted by NIVA.
Between 1907 and 1935, two developments determined the
evolution of the Dutch accounting industry. Firstly, the demand for
accountants increased with the growth of the number of large
enterprises. Secondly, the scope of services expected from ac-
countants expanded and became more complex, an example being
entry into consultancy activities (Bogaert et al., 2010; de Vries,
1985). However, despite the increasing need for accountants, the
discussions and struggles between different associations continued
in this period, further triggering the emergence of new associa-
tions. This is visualized in Fig. 1.
These developments and increasing concerns within the pro-
fession resulted in unification efforts. The aim was to introduce a
uniform federal exam issued by a new independent institution.
These efforts were associated with the merger of a few of the as-
sociations: NIVA and NAV in 1919 (Instituut), Organisatie andFig. 1. Number of professional associatioAcademie (Organisatie) in 1922 and, finally, Instituut, Organisatie
and Bond in 1934. This process of consolidation implied that the
profession gained increasing societal esteem and legitimation.
Finally, supported by the introduction of legal rules, the Dutch ac-
counting profession became institutionalized at the beginning of
World War II (Bogaert et al., 2010; de Vries, 1985).3.2. Density dependence studies
Earlier ecology-inspired work on the Dutch accounting industry
mainly focuses on the relationship between classic density and
founding/mortality rates (Boone, Br€ocheler, & Carroll, 2000;
Br€ocheler et al., 2004; Cattani, Pennings, & Wezel, 2003; Pennings,
Lee, & van Witteloostuijn, 1998). Boone et al. (2000), focusing on
the early decades in the industry’s history, reveal an effect of
density on founding and mortality rates that is opposite to that
predicted by classic density dependence theory. According to the
findings of Boone et al., density-related legitimation processes
failed to materialize at the onset of the Dutch audit industry, with
density not affecting entry rates positively and exit rates negatively
(2000: 372). In a follow-up study, Cattani et al. (2003) propose that
the main explanation for this is the absence of any control for
geographical heterogeneity within the population in Boone et al.
(2000). Therefore, Cattani et al. (2003) analyze founding rates in
the Dutch accounting industry as a function of spatial density,
revealing evidence in support of classic density dependence theory.
Bogaert et al. (2010) adopt another perspective. They analyze
the Dutch accounting industry by taking Hannan et al.’s (2007)
revised theory of density dependence as their steppingstone.
Their main focus is on legitimation and firm exit. They provide
support for hypotheses central to the revised density dependence
theory, revealing the central role of fuzzy density and contrast.
Their key argument is that Boone et al.’s (2000) findings can be
explained by the fuzziness that characterized the early evolution of
the industry, implying that the increase of classic density cannot
capture processes of legitimation in the early decades of the Dutch
accounting industry. In the current study, we further develop this
perspective by focusing on the role of multiple competing logics
represented by different self-regulatory professional associations in
the context of a revised density dependence framework, analyzing
the impact of this environment of contestation on founding rates.ns in Dutch accounting, 1884e1939.
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In emerging fields that can be described in terms of multiple
institutional logics, we can treat the adopters of a specific institu-
tional logic as a sub-population. In such a contested environment,
the critical question for a newcomer will be how to identify itself
vis-a-vis the different logics and associated sub-populations. In the
face of multiple institutional logics, if the form does not have a
taken-for-granted status, newcomers will have different options in
terms of the templates to adopt, and hence as to how to define their
identity. If a single institutional logic dominates the field, the
boundaries of the profession are relatively solid, the criteria for the
form are already defined, and hence entry barriers are higher e all
compared to the case of multiple competing institutional logics.
However, if the form does not have a taken-for-granted status,
and if multiple institutional logics circulate in the emerging field,
then a newcomer has the freedom to choose from this set of
competing logics, or even to propose a new institutional logic as
part of strategic behavior aimed at differentiation by developing
distinguishing features. Therefore, adding a specific institutional
logice represented by collective action in the form of a specific self-
regulatory association proposing an alternative template e will
expand the boundaries of the whole population by opening up
niches for newcomers. This makes entry easier: as the number of
competing logics increases in the emerging field, more sub-
populations are created; and as more sub-populations are
created, the founding rate for any sub-population will increase.
We can translate this argument to the Dutch accounting in-
dustry as follows. As the number of professional associations in-
creases in an emerging field, every newcomer would have the
freedom to choose one of these associations to be a member of, or
may even decide to come up with a totally different understanding
of the form, and establish a new association related to this under-
standing. Therefore, each association with a different institutional
logic would reduce entry barriers and increase foundings.
Hypothesis 1. The number of associations is positively related
with the organizational founding rate in a focal association’s sub-
population.
Hypothesis 1 provides a ceteris paribus benchmark prediction
only, ignoring heterogeneity among associations and the alterna-
tive logics they promote. However, we cannot assume that each
collective action e here, in the form of self-regulatory associations
e representing and supporting a different institutional logic will
increase the legitimation of the emerging form. Instead, we argue
that while contestation among collective actors does hamper the
development of a legitimate collective identity, the impact on the
overall legitimacy of the formwill differ from one collective actor to
the other depending on the “quality” or “status”1 of the institu-
tional logic proposed by the specific collective actor. Legitimation of
a form is a common good, open to exploitation just like in exem-
plary cases such as fisheries and forests (Barnett & King, 2008).
That is, if participation in these kinds of collective action, such as
self-regulatory associations, is voluntary, the risk of free-riding is
always there (Lenox, 2006; Ostrom, 1990). Therefore, we have to
take into account the spillover effects between different types of
collective actors, as well as those that do not participate in any
collective action. We argue that the key dimension of heterogeneity
is the status e or quality e of the collective actors. In our Dutch
accounting industry context, this relates to the strictness of the
professional requirements and standards as promoted by each as-
sociation. As a collective good, form legitimation transcends to all1 ‘Status’ and ‘quality’ are highly related concepts in our context.sub-populations and all associations. However, the contribution of
each association to overall legitimacy of the emerging form de-
pends on their quality. To achieve high quality, high selectivity with
respect to the admission of members is required for any focal as-
sociation in order to keep a high professional standard. However, in
such a case, there is also the incentive to deviate in the context of
competition with other associations by setting a lower standard in
order to attract more members. The more associations follow this
strategy, the more the average quality of the profession will
decrease.
Hypothesis 2. The number of associations is positively related
with the organizational founding rate in a focal association’s sub-
population especially when the focal association’s offering is of
low quality.
One of the important assumptions of classic density dependence
theory is that eachmember of the population contributes equally to
the legitimacy of the form. However, competing institutional logics
blur the boundaries of a field, by causing ambiguity or fuzziness as
to what the new form precisely does entail. In such a fragmented
environment, featuring multiple competing logics represented by
rivaling self-regulatory professional associations, increased fuzzi-
ness will, in turn, decrease the overall legitimacy of the form. In
order to take into account the impact of fuzziness on the legiti-
mation of the form, Hannan et al. (2007) introduce a revised theory
of density dependent legitimation. This theory incorporates fuzzi-
ness in the form emergence process by introducing the new
concept of grade-of-membership (GoM), which indicates the de-
gree to which an entity (organization) belongs to the set (popula-
tion) (Hannan et al., 2007, p. 15). A fuzzy set provides descriptions
of cases inwhichmembership can be partial. If the organization is a
full-fledgedmember of a population, then the GoM value is equal to
1; if the entity does not belong to the population at all, then the
GoM value is equal to 0. This can be seen as the classic perspective
to analyze the membership of entities.
In the form suggested by the revised theory, the membership of
an organization can take any value between 0 and 1, denoting
partial membership of the entity for any value: 0 < GoM <1. An
organization may contribute to different fields by being a member
of multiple populations. Building on Hannan et al. (2007), we claim
that in an environment that features multiple competing logics, as
represented by different self-regulatory professional associations in
the Dutch accounting industry, fuzziness will increase. This will, in
turn, decrease the overall legitimacy of the accounting organiza-
tional form, which backlashes, on average, to all associations. In
order to analyze the impact of fuzziness on the overall legitimacy of
the form, we employ GoM weighted density. That is, we assign
different GoM-values to organizations in the industry, taking into
account the contributions of individual organizations to the
population-level legitimation of the form (see the Methodology
section on this). When GoM-weighted density increases, fuzziness
decreases and, as a result, the overall legitimacy of the form will
increase. This, in turn, spurs the founding rate of accounting firms
in all focal associations.
Hypothesis 3. GoM-weighted density is positively related with
the organizational founding rate in a focal association’s sub-
population.
However, low-quality associations are expected to benefit more
from the externalities generated during the gradual legitimation
process of the form, as explained above. The reason is that high-
quality associations are more visible and powerful as individual
entities because of their high selectivity. Hence, they rely less on
their category membership for their identity (Bogaert et al., 2010).
In our setting of the Dutch accounting industry, this translates into
the argument that potential members of low-quality professional
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density.
Hypothesis 4. GoM-weighted density is positively related with
the organizational founding rate in a focal association’s sub-
population especially when the focal association’s offering is of
low quality.5. Methodology
5.1. Data
Our data include information about the Dutch accounting in-
dustry for the emergence period 1884e1939. We model founding
rates (defined as the yearly number of new entrants) at the level of
each and every professional association, implying that we have
panel data for all associations that are observed over time. We
constructed an extra category for the ‘mixed’ foundings, defined as
the newcomer accounting firms inwhich accountants are members
of different associations. In total, the database consists of 133 ob-
servations. The number of observations is 107 without the ‘mixed’
category.
The data are gathered from the membership lists of the Dutch
accountant associations, financial directories, annual reports, and
minutes of accountant associations. Membership lists contain in-
formation at the level of the individual accountant (Maijoor et al.,
1995). This information is aggregated to the firm and association
level in order to reconstruct the life histories of all accounting firms
active in this period of the industry’s history (Buijink, 1993);
Maijoor et al., 1995; Bogaert et al., 2010). The number of firms in
which the accountants are not member of any association are also
included in the data as a “non-member” category.
5.2. Independent variables
The main independent variables are based on the counts of or-
ganizations in the (sub-) population. The first three independent
variables are straightforward density measures. The first is the
number of self-regulatory professional associations, denoted
Number of associations, operating at time t. During the observation
period, 14 associations ever existed. For details about year of
founding and exit, and other descriptives of each association, we
refer to Bogaert et al. (2010: 133). The second is Classic density,
referring to the number of organizations operating in the popula-
tion at time t. For robustness analysis, we also employ Own density,
which involves the organizational density within the association to
which the firm belongs at time t.
To construct the fourth independent variable, GoM-weighted
density at the population level, referred to as Weighted density,
the contribution of each organization to the legitimacy of the
profession at the population level is counted by estimating each
organization’s GoM. The latter can be estimated by means of the
relative popularity of its association in the population (see Bogaert
et al., 2010). Aggregating these GoMs results in a weighted density
count that explicitly captures “fuzziness” of the form. Formally,






where Nt equals the number of organizations in the population at
time t, and Nit represents the organizational density of association i
at time t (Bogaert et al., 2010). The numbers of organizations not
being a member of any association are counted as “not-associated”(as a result, i goes from 1 to 15). If all organizations, say 100, are
members of the same association, then fuzziness is zero, implying
that classic and weighted density are both equal to 100. If there are
two associations each with 50 organizations, then classic density
still equals 100. However, each organization’s GoMwould only be .5
(50/100; instead of 1) and weighted density would only equal
0.5*50 þ 0.5*50 ¼ 50, thus taking fuzziness into account. We
employ lagged values of Classic density, Own density and Weighted
density in order to avoid simultaneity issues.
The final independent variable is included as a key component
of interaction termswith our focal density variables: the statuse or
quality e of a professional association. High-quality association is
coded as 1 for NIVA or NAV, which are the high-quality associations,
and 0 otherwise [see de Vries (1985) and Bogaert et al. (2000) for
evidence for this dichotomy]. Of course, High-quality association is
added as a main or simple effect variable, too. Since we have no
main effect hypothesis for High-quality association, this measure is
treated as a control variable.
5.3. Control variables
Following earlier work on the Dutch accounting industry (e.g.,
Pennings et al., 1998; Bogaert et al., 2010; Boone et al., 2000; 2009),
we include a series of control variables, particularly to filter out the
effect of increasing demand e or carrying capacity, as this is
referred to in organizational ecology. Specifically, any change in
demand for accountancy services could well explain any change in
the founding rate of accountancy firms (our dependent variable).
Moreover, in line with the organizational ecology tradition (see,
e.g., Kendrick et al., 2003), we lag our critical demand control var-
iables, to minimize the likelihood of endogeneity.
First, we introduce a dummy variable for World War I, which
equals 1 for the years between 1914 and 1918, and 0 otherwise. We
expect that the founding rates might have been depressed in this
period. Second, in order to control for the demand for accounting
services, we add the yearly number of newly established limited
liability firms, referred to as New limited liability firm density (ob-
tained from the yearly editions of Van Nierop & Baak’s Naamlooze
Vennootschappen), since the need for transparency, and hence the
demand for accounting services, increased with the emergence of
modern limited liability firms at the end of the 19th and beginning
of the 20th century (Bogaert et al., 2010; Edwards, 1989). Third, we
include lagged Founding and Mortality. We expect that previous
exits will open space for the newcomers, and vice versa for the
previous entries. We introduce two-year lagged values of both
variables. Finally, we add a dummy variable for the Pre-association
period that takes 0 for the pre-association period and 1 otherwise.
This dummy allows us to control for the period starting with the
foundation of the first accounting firm (1883) until the foundation
of the first professional accounting association (1895).
5.4. Model specification
Since our dependent variables are count measures, a Poisson
process provides a natural baseline model for organizational
founding processes (Hannan & Freeman, 1987). The basic Poisson
model for event count data is
PrðYt ¼ yÞ¼ elðxtÞ½lðxtÞy = y!;
where both the expected number of events in a unit interval e that
is PrðYt ¼ yÞ e and the variance of the number of events in each
interval equal the rate lðxtÞ. Poisson regression becomes non-
robust if the variance of the dependent variable exceeds its mean,
which is known as overdispersion (McCullagh et al., 1989).
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standard errors might be underestimated, thus generating chi-
square values that are overestimated (Wezel, 2005).
Negative binomial regression deals adequately with over-
dispersion (Cattani et al., 2003; Hannan & Freeman, 1989). In this
approach, a stochastic error component is added to the model. The
error component has a Gamma distribution that parametrizes
overdispersion (Wezel, 2005). Because of overdispersion in our
sample, we apply the negative binomial regression model. The
general formulation is
lt ¼ expðp’xtÞεt ;
where the error term εt follows a Gamma distribution.
We have panel data, where the cross-sections correspond to
associations and the time series to years. To deal with potential
autocorrelation, following Baron, Hannan, and Burton (2001), we
used Liang and Zeger’s (1986) method of generalized estimating
equations (GEE). GEE generalizes quasi-likelihood estimation to the
panel data context. We assume an exchangeable autocorrelation
structure. The results are robust for other assumed autocorrelation
structures. This provides further evidence that autocorrelation is
unlikely to drive our results. Because the observations within the
associations cannot be assumed to be independent, we report
Huber-White robust standard errors. We used STATA 9.0 for sta-
tistical analyses.5.5. Causality
As in any design that is not a randomized trial, causal inference
is potentially a challenge. Theoretically, with reference to the spe-
cific historical context of the Dutch accounting industry, we argue
that endogeneity is unlikely to be an issue and that causality runs in
the direction we hypothesize. Empirically, we could benefit from
the unbalanced panel nature of our data to minimize the likelihood
of endogeneity and reversed causality, in line with best practices in
the organizational ecology tradition (cf. McKendrick et al., 2003).
First, we added critical control variables to filter out the influence of
demand (or carrying capacity), which is an obvious alternative
explanation for founding. Second, to avoid simultaneity, we lagged
essential control and independent variables with one or two years.
Third, we adopted the GEE method with robust standard errors,
correcting for autocorrelation.6. Findings
Descriptive statistics and correlations are reported in Table 1,
and the association-level founding rates model’s estimates are
provided in Tables 2 and 3.2
We first focus on the effects of the main control variables, as
reported in Model 1 in Table 2. Lagged Founding does not have any
significant impact, and lagged Mortality has a significantly positive
impact, as expected, suggesting that firms that exit from the in-
dustry open up space for newcomers. High-quality association and
New limited liability firm density have a significantly positive effect
on the founding rates. The estimates of World War I and Pre-asso-
ciation period are both non-significant.
Model 2 in Table 2 shows a significantly positive effect of the
Number of associations on the organizational founding rate in the2 For the models in which we analyze the moderating impact of association
quality, we removed the observations that are belonging to the ‘mixed’ founding
category because these observations are unclassifiable. For this reason, the number
of observations is less for the interaction models with association quality.focal association’s sub-population: The contestation between pro-
fessional associations, which represent competing institutional
logics, spurs founding rates as entry barriers are reduced. This
result provides support for H1. The moderating effect of High-
quality association on the founding rate in the focal association’s
sub-population in Model 3 in Table 2 is significantly negative,
which is in line with H2. Fig. 2 visualizes this interaction. The
number of associations increases the founding rate especially when
the focal association’s offering is of low quality.
In Model 4 of Table 2, we test the impact of Weighted density on
associational founding rates. We find that Weighted density signif-
icantly increases an association’s founding rate, which is as pre-
dicted in H3. Model 5 of Table 2 shows that Classic Density also
increases the founding rate. However, when we compare Models 4
and 5, we observe that the effect of Classic density is much smaller
than that of Weighted density. To further analyze the impact of
fuzziness on founding, we conducted an additional analysis
focusing on the interaction of Classic Density and Number of asso-
ciations. Model 6 includes the interaction effect of Classic Density
and Number of associations, showing that this interaction is signif-
icantly negative, which also supports H3. Fig. 3 visualizes this
interaction effect. As expected, classic density only spurs the
founding rate when the number of associations e and thus fuzzi-
ness e is low.
Finally, the result in Model 7 provides support for H4: Weighted
density significantly increases the founding rate particularly in Low-
quality associations. Fig. 4 plots this interaction effect.
In Models 8 to 15, reported in Table 3, we provide estimates of
models added by way of robustness analyses. In these models,
firstly, we analyzed the impact of Own density on associational
foundings. Secondly, the focal variables are included in pairwise
combinations in order to check which effects of the independent
variables are unique. From Model 8 in Table 3, we learn that the
Own density of a focal association significantly increases the orga-
nizational founding rate in that focal association’s sub-population
by signaling that the legitimacy of that particular template in-
duces entries into that self-regulatory association. For the pairwise
combinations, first, we treat the Number of associations as a control
variable, adding the other focal independent variables one by one
(Models 9 to 11). Own density,Weighted density, and the interaction
of High-quality association and Weighted density are still significant.
Subsequently, in Models 12 to 14, we control for Own density. Again,
the results are robust, except for the interaction of High-quality
association andWeighted density. Moreover, inModel 15, we include
the Number of associations, Weighted density and Own density
simultaneously to the model: the estimate of Weighted density
turns insignificant. All in all, we can conclude that the effects of the
Number of associations and Own density dominate.
7. Discussion and conclusion
The analysis reported here enhances prior work in the new ac-
counting history tradition by taking into account the tension be-
tween structural and agency explanations of institutionalization.
We do so by integrating institutional logic thinking (Lounsbury,
2008) in organizational ecology’s revised theory of density
dependence (Hannan et al., 2007), adding a complementary lens to
the literature on the history of the industry. We apply our inte-
grative framework to the case of legitimation development in the
context of the new organizational form emergence process in the
early days of the Dutch accounting industry. The concept of insti-
tutional logic takes into account both the broader cultural beliefs
and rules that structure the field, as well as the decision-making of
actors in the field (Purdy & Gray, 2009). Given the critique of neo-
institutional theory as to the latter’s weak formulation of
Table 2
Negative binomial regression models for the founding rate of Dutch accounting firms.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Constant 31
(.48)
-.89 (.70) 1.52 (1.07) -.25 (.47) -.12 (.55) 1.76** (.75) -.03 (.35)
Founding (t-2) 02
(.02)
.01 (.02) .01 (.01) .02 (.02) .01 (.02) .02 (.02) .02 (.02)
Mortality (t-2) 01***
(.004)
.01*** (.004) .01*** (.01) -.003 (.005) -.01 (.004) .001 (.01) .02*** (.01)
High-quality associations 1.36***
(.23)
1.59*** (.24) 3.38*** (1.06) 1.37*** (.20) 1.46*** (.21) 1.58*** (.25) 1.72*** (.41)
New limited liability firm density 001**
(.0003)
.0001 (.0003) .0001 (.0004) .001*** (.0003) .001 (.0003) .0002 (.0004) .001*** (.0003)
World War I 09
(.24)
-.07 (.24) -.10 (.28) .12 (.26) .13 (.26) -.36 (.33) -.01 (.31)
Pre-association period -.26
(.30)
1.02 (.62) 1.83** (.93) .24 (.35) .20 (.43) 1.80** (.72) .07 (.36)
Number of Associations .29*** (.09) .39*** (.12) . .48*** (.15)
Classic Density (t-1) 004*** (.001) .01** (.003)










Wald Chi2 97.16*** 132.16*** 148.70*** 154.37*** 136.51*** 90.22*** 404.92***
n¼133 n¼133 n¼107 n¼133 n¼133 n¼133 n¼107
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; and ***p < 0.01 (two-tailed).
Table 3
Robustness analyses: Own density and pairwise combinations.
Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15
Constant .30 (.45) -.78 (.77) 1.28* (.70) 1.10 (.84) 1.48 (1.07) -.03 (.44) -.15 (.33) 1.00 (.76)
Founding (t-2) 3.19e-07 (0.01) -.003 (.01) .01 (.02) .01 (.02) -.01 (.01) .01 (.01) -.01 (.02) .0004 (.01)
Mortality (t-2) .003 (.004) .003 (.004) -.0003 (.005) .02** (.01) .01* (.01) -.004 (.004) .01 (.01) -.002 (.005)
High-quality associations .74*** (.16) 1.00*** (.17) 1.60*** (.22) 2.00*** (.31) 2.95*** (1.01) .89*** (.17) 1.13** (.46) 1.11** (.16)
New limited liability firm density .001*** (.0003) .0002 (.0003) .0003 (.0003) .0002 (.0003) .0002 (.0003) .001*** (.0003) .001*** (.0003) .0003 (.0003)
World War I .02 (.26) -.16 (.26) -.07 (.26) -.14 (.31) -.16 (.31) .06 (.26) -.10 (.36) -.13 (.27)
Pre-association period -.31 (.32) .86 (.70) 1.35** (.65) 1.28 (.84) 1.74* (.97) .003 (.38) .15 (.39) 1.06 (.72)
Number of Associations .27*** (.10) .28*** (.09) .29** (.13) .38*** (.13) .01 (.01) .27*** (.10)
Own Density (t-1) .01*** (.003) .01*** (.002) . .01*** (.003) .01*** (.004) .01 (.01) .01*** (.003)








-.01** (.005) -.01 (.01)
Wald Chi2 79.47*** 107.50*** 184.82*** 136.38*** 106.49*** 116.45*** 41.31*** 147.84***
n¼133 n¼133 n¼133 n¼107 n¼107 n¼133 n¼107 n¼133
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; and ***p < 0.01 (two-tailed).
Table 1
Descriptive statistics.
Mean S.D. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1. Founding rate 4.87 8.26 0 58 e
2. Number of Associations 5.12 2.35 0 8 .16* e
3. Classic Density (t-1) 174.56 123.98 1 379 .24* .42* e
4. Weighted Density (t-1) 48.36 36.80 1 170.40 .23* .13 .86* e
5. Own Density (t-1) 22.36 33.51 0 226 .68* .12 .43* .44* e
6. Founding (t-2) 4.77 7.44 0 42 .53* .11 .34* .29* .73* e
7. Mortality (t-2) 20.58 19.98 0 61 .23* .12 .82* .80* .39* .36* e
8. High-quality Associations .13 .34 0 1 .53* -.05 -.02 .02 .62* .49* -.004 e
9. New limited liability firm density 745.29 459.67 38 1758 .05 .67* -.04 -.26* -.07 -.05 -.15 -.03 e
10. Pre-association period .07 .26 0 1 -.15 -.62* -.38* -.34* -.17* -.15 -.26* -.11 -.40* e
11.World War I .17 .37 0 1 -.05 .37* -.22* -.30* -.11 -.16 -.30* -.02 .38* -.13 e
*p < 0.05 (two-tailed), n ¼ 133.
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Fig. 3. The interaction effect of Classic Density and Number of Associations on accounting firm founding rate.
Fig. 4. The interaction effect of Weighted Density and Quality on accounting firm founding rate.
Fig. 2. The interaction effect of Number of associations and their Quality on accounting firm founding rate.
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field as decision-makers, as well as the structure of the field in
terms of the organization of collective action.
In this context, we introduce the concept of organizational
identity by emphasizing the process of identity realization in order
to explain the variation in practices e or institutional logics e in
emerging industries (King et al., 2011). The vehicle for this is the
organization of competing collective action initiatives, each pro-
moting an alternative institutional logic in the form of an organi-
zational template for the emerging field. Here, identity realization
is critical. As the answer to the “who are we?” question differs
between rivaling collective action initiatives in the early history of
an emerging form, organizations develop their own identity
depending upon their answers. The organizational identity corre-
sponding with the dominant institutional logic eventually crystal-
lizes into a population-level collective identity that serves, in turn,
as a template for organizational action.
So, in this early history of an emerging field, the fragmented
structure of the environment comes with contestation of rivaling
institutional logics, organized through competing collective action
initiatives. Such a fragmented population features a set of sub-
populations, each of these promoting an alternative template for
the emerging organizational form. As a consequence, the evolution
of classic density does not reflect the underlying struggle for
legitimation, as its assumption of organizational homogeneity does
not sit well with the fragmented state of the emerging population.
Rather, weighted density, emphasizing organizational heteroge-
neity and partial grades of (sub-)population membership, captures
the intrinsically fuzzy process of collective population-level legiti-
macy development in an emerging field where different institu-
tional logics fight for dominance (Bogaert et al., 2010; Hannan et al.,
2007).
The case of the early history of the Dutch accounting industry in
the late 19th and early 20th century nicely fits with this theoretical
argument. In these early days, a unique official authority for regu-
lating the profession was lacking. The organizational actors in this
emerging field, accountants, engaged in strategic behavior as
decision-makers by organizing collective action in the form of
rivaling professional associations. To take into account the role of
decision-makers and the identity realization process, we formal-
ized ourmeasures at the level of the sub-population of associations,
focusing on the sub-populations’ founding rates. Our argument is
that these associations were vehicles of collective action of the
associated sub-populations that promoted competing institutional
logics. As expected, indeed, our results reveal that as the number of
competing logics reflected by the number of associations increases,
association-level founding rates increase as well, since rivaling
associations enlarge the options for newcomers and decrease entry
barriers.
However, competing institutional logics may well differ in their
quality, and hence in their impact on founding rates. Specifically,
we argue that rivaling institutional logics differ in the status e or
quality e of the corresponding organizational template. In the
Dutch accounting industry setting, this is reflected in the more or
less strict membership requirements and professional standards
promoted by different associations. According to our results, even
though low-quality associations open up space for newcomers,
they hamper the overall legitimacy of the emerging profession by
undermining the requirements to be an accountant. We explain
this by arguing that overall legitimacy of a population is an intan-
gible common pool resource e or “commons” (Ostrom, 1990). As in
the case of forests and fisheries, legitimacy can be conceptualized
as a common good that all members of a population benefit from.
However, as with all common goods, self-interested behavior may
have consequences for the whole population.Additionally, our study provides a contribution to density
dependence theory by taking into account the heterogeneity in the
industry during the form emergence process, and by providing
support that density weighted by grades of membership (GoM) is a
better measure in order to explain this process. With a few ex-
ceptions (e.g., Bogaert et al., 2010; McKendrick et al., 2003), prior
studies neglected this heterogeneity that is intrinsically connected
to the organizational form emergence process. In our study, in line
with this revised density dependence theory, we employ GoM-
weighted density in order to measure the impact of this hetero-
geneity. In support of the revised theory, we find that weighted
density measures outperform their classic density counterparts in
our organizational founding rate analyses.
In the case of the Dutch accounting industry, competition
among associations generates quality differences, reflected in the
entry criteria they promote for the profession. The end result of this
competition and contestation is lower entry barriers for the low-
quality associations. Low-quality associations harm the process of
collective legitimation development at the population level, but
they do so whilst enhancing entry into their own sub-population.
With quality differences, legitimation externalities across sub-
populations are asymmetric: low-quality associations benefit
from legitimation-increasing densities in high-quality associations,
but not vice versa.
Fromwhat we know of the history of the accounting industry in
other countries in the new accounting history tradition, the above
logic might well explain the early evolution in countries such as
England, Scotland, the UK and the US (e.g., Walker, 1991, 1995,
2004; Preston et al., 1995; Robson et al., 1994; Wilmott, 1986), as
well as Australia, Belgium, Canada and South Africa (e.g., Carnegie
& Edwards, 2001; Chua & Poullaos, 2002; De Beelde, 2002), with
contesting professional associations standing for different quality
standards. Future work in different countries is needed to examine
the extent towhich the Dutch case is specific or generalizes to other
contexts. And in the latter case, such replication work may reveal
the contingencies that determine the specifics of historical trajec-
tories across countries.
Combining insights from the new accounting history literature
with those from the current study, we would like to suggest three
ideas for future work, by way of illustration. A key argument from
the new accounting history literature is that an important aim of
professional accounting associations in many countries was (and is)
to lobby for state regulation that benefits the profession by (a) of-
fering the right to control entry into the profession and (b) intro-
ducing mandatory auditing regulation. This combination implies
that the profession can self-regulate the supply of services in a
market with mandatory demand. Creating “artifical” scarcity in this
way is a very powerful rent-seeking strategy (see Maijoor & van
Witteloostuijn, 1996). Taking the current paper’s logic to this
issue suggests that we can expect that countries hosting a lower
number of competing professional associations in the early days of
the industry’s history were more successful, and were so earlier in
their history, to have the wished regulation e i.e., (a) and (b) above
e in place. Studying this requires a multi-country comparative
research design (cf. Boone, Meuwissen, & van Witteloostuijn,
2009), with sufficient variation in the key independent variable e
i.e., the number of competing professional associations. To this we
could add the second hypothesis, again based on the current pa-
per’s theory, that this effect is moderated by cross-association
quality differences: The larger these differences, the lower will be
the likelihood that (a) and (b) will be introduced (early). Finally, a
third future research suggestion relates to the issue of generaliz-
ability. In the later history of an industry, including accounting, a
reverse evolution may emerge when, for whatever reason, the
number of professional associations does increase, reducing the
A.D. Çakmaklı et al. / Accounting, Organizations and Society 83 (2020) 101104 11industry’s legitimacy and making lobbying less effective.
Much of the above implies that we need further work in other
countries, preferably in the form of comparative cross-country
designs, to deepen our understanding of the underlying causal
chain, as well as the latter’s boundary conditions (cf. Boone et al.,
2009). Specifically, different countries are associated with
different evolutionary processes, as witnessed in a different asso-
ciational and regulatory dynamic. For instance, in the Netherlands,
the merger of the professional associations into a single monopolist
co-emerged with national regulation regarding the demand and
supply of accountancy services (see Maijoor & van Witteloostuijn,
1996). Hence, to carefully unravel the combined and relative ef-
fect on founding rates of competing associations and demand-
promoting regulations, we have to turn to another country.
Generally, to replicate studies in different samples (here, countries)
is conducive to the development of accumulative knowledge,
including systematic insight into the impact of boundary conditions
(Walker, Brewer, Lee, Petrovsky, & van Witteloostuijn, 2019).
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